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NOTES
Bills and Notes - Construcive Accepiance of
a Check by Retention
A check was drawn on the defendant bank and made payable
to the plaintiff. The check was deposited with the X bank for
collection and forwarded by X bank to the Y bank. Y bank for-
warded the check to the Federal Reserve Bank which sent it by
mail to the defendant bank. The defendant bank, upon receipt
of the check, marked it "return" because of insufficient funds.
The following day Federal bank examiners seized control of the
cash items of the bank, and as a consequence the defendant bank
was unable to trace and return the check for more than forty-
eight hours. Plaintiff, payee, brought suit contending that the de-
fendant bank had accepted the check by its silent holding for
more than twenty-four hours. Held, that the failure of the de-
fendant bank to return the check within twenty-four hours after
its receipt did not constitute acceptance.'
The only problem considered by the court in the instant case
was whether a check presented for payment fell within the pur-
view of the controversial section 1372 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law. The court unequivocally distinguishes present-
ment for payment from section 137 in stating that "Payment ex-
tinguishes the debt and puts an end to the paper evidencing the
same, while acceptance has the very opposite effect in creating a
new liability upon the part of the acceptor and gives new life to
the instrument".3 The implicit reasoning of the court seems to be
that in the case of most negotiable instruments presentment for
payment cannot be made until the instrument is due, while pre-
sentment for acceptance under section 137 should be made before
maturity. Thus, when a check is presented for payment, section
137 does not apply unless there is an affirmative demand by the
holder coupled with an affirmative refusal by the drawee, since
the mere retention of a demand item cannot constitute acceptance. 4
' Urwiller v. Platte Valley Bank, 164 Neb. 630, 83 N.W.2d 88 (1957).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 62-1,137 (Reissue 1958), which provides: "Where
a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance destroys the
same or refuses within twenty-four hours after such deliver...
to return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, he will
be deemed to have accepted the same." Hereinafter cited as the
N. I. L.
S supra note 1, at 635.
4 See First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Whitmore, 177 F. 397 (8th Cir. 1910).
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Indeed the court's reasoning, requiring demand and refusal to
constitute liability on the drawee bank, would apply to a face-to-
face transaction since the holder has presented the instrument
and is in a position to demand the money or the return of the
instrument.5 However such reasoning is totally inapplicable to
existing commercial mail transactions where the drawee bank is
the agent for collection of the holder and is under a contract duty
to pay or charge back the check.
The N.I.L. is silent on the question of how long a drawee bank
may have to pay a check received through the mail as distinguished
from over the counter transactions. The court in Wisner v. First
Nat. Bank" recognized this, and section 1378 of the N.I.L. was
judicially expanded to fill the existing "gap"; thus making the
drawee bank, who held a check too long, liable as an implied ac-
ceptor for the face value of the check. The Wisner holding repre-
sents the weight of authority9 and the proper interpretation of the
N.I.L., namely, to reach a convenient and workable result which
insures uniformity in all cases involving presentment of instru-
ments.10
The court, in the instant case, not only rejects the Wisner
holding but completely overlooks additional applicable Nebraska
5 Jeune v. Ward, 1 Am. & Aid. 653, 106 Reprint 240, (1818); Mason
v. Barff, 2 Barn, & Ald. 26, 106 Reprint 240 (1818); Westberg v.
Chicago Lumber Co., 117 Wis. 589, 94 N.W. 572 (1903); Holbrook v.
Payne, 151 Mass. 383, 24 N.E. 210 (1890).
0 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 62-307 (Reissue 1958); Placek v. Edstrom, 148
Neb. 79, 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947).
7 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 995 (1908). The legislature amended § 137
shortly after the Wisner decision and abrogated the doctrine for
which the case stands. However the Pennsylvania legislature unani-
mously passed the Uniform Commercial Code in 1953 which adopts
the Wisner holding. See Pa. Stat. Anno. Tit. 12A, § 4-303 (1954).
See also State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N.Y.S. 276 (1904).
8 The draftsman of the N.I.L. took § 137 from a New York statute
[1 Rev. Stat. 769 § 11 (N.Y. 1829)], which had been in force many
years. In construing this early statute the court of appeals of that state
held that the refusal spoken of meant an affirmative act and that a
mere omission to return where there was no demand was not a
refusal within the statute. Mattison v. Moulton, 79 N.Y. 627 (1880).
9 Cases are cited in BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW 1249 (7th ed. 1948).
10 Although th N.I.L. does not contain a section, found in so many
uniform acts, which provides that it shall be uniformly interpreted,
it is clear from its title, history, and intent that such is the purpose
of the Act. Clem. v. Chapman, 262 S. W. 168, 171 (Tex. Civ. App.
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statutory provisions. Section 62-213" gives the collecting bank the
right to treat an instrument as dishonored if not paid in due course,
and section 62-30812 provides that the bank may have until midnight
of its next business day after receipt in which to honor or refuse
payment of such item. 13 It should be noted that neither statute
or regulation expressly state the effect of a drawee bank retaining
a check more than twenty-four hours, and thus the hiatus as under
the N.I.L. would still exist. However, it would seem that a standard
of conduct is established for a drawee bank; namely, if notice of
dishonor by non-payment is not dispatched by midnight of its next
business day, prior parties would be relieved from liability on
the check,14 and the holder is thereby damaged to that extent.
Indeed commercial custom would dictate the drawee bank giving
notice of dishonor for non-payment 15 and reverse any charge made
by midnight of the next business day. This conforms to the terms
of collection under the Federal Reserve System, which are appli-
cable to the instant case,16 and to the Clearing House practices.
The recently proposed Uniform Commercial Code ' adopts the
Wisner rule,'3 and makes the drawee bank "accountable" for the
1942), aff'd, 114 Tex. 583, 278 S. W. 1114 (1924). For other cases
on the well established rule of construction that the Act should
be so interpreted as to reach uniformtiy, see BEUTEL'S BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 103 (7th ed. 1948).
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 62-213 (Reissue 1958).
12 Neb. Rev .Stat. § 62-308 (Reissue 1958).
13 This fact is also evidenced by the Federal Reserve regulations, see
Check Clearing and Collection, Regulation J. Sec. 5, (Jan. 1959),
providing: "Any check which a Federal Reserve bank or an agent
thereof presents to the drawee bank for payment or sends to the
drawee bank for collection . .. may be returned for credit or refund
at any time prior to midnight of the drawee's next business day
following such day of receipt ... such paragraph shall not apply
to checks presented over the counter." Operating Letter #3, April
15, 1957, provides: "Wire advice of non-payment of all items of
$1,000 or over ......
14 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 89; Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 62-189 (Reissue 1958); Bacigalupo v. Parrili, 112 N.Y. Supp. 1040
(1908).
15 See Hollenbeck Receiver v. Leimert Receiver, 295 U.S. 116 (1935),
holding the indorser is not liable and the check is paid when the
drawee fails to comply with a clearing house rule requiring it to
notify the member bank within a specified time in case of dishonor
for non-payment.
16 Supra note 13.
17 UNIFORM -COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 4-301, 4-302 (1957).
Is supra note 7; U.L.A., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, (Amendments
1954), Sub-committee Report, 142.
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check, and establishes a precise time when an item must be re-
turned.
The apparent paradoxical reasoning that a check could be
both impliedly accepted and dishonored at the. same time 9 under
section 62-308 is unconsequential.20 The central point is that there
is no definite standard or precise time in which a drawee bank
must act under the N.I.L. or section 62-308. Either of the above
positions would dictate adoption of the retention rule in the mail
presentment situations, and whether the rule is based on duty to
dishonor or implied acceptance is immaterial because they both
afford the needed remedial relief, particularly in view of the
drawee bank being in possession of the facts surrounding the trans-
action and the impossible burden of proof placed on the holder
under the common law remedies. 21  Policy would support such
a result on the following reasons: (1) Where checks are mailed
directly to the payor bank there should be some sanction com-
pelling it to act on them with commercial diligence. (2) The
interest of the depositor initiating bank collection, who is usually
a seller, requires that he receive prompt notice that his buyer's
attempted payment for the goods or services has not resulted in
bank credit available for the seller's use. (3) Depository banks
often permit their depositors to withdraw the credit after a fixed
lapse of time calculated by computing the time for the check to
reach the payor bank and for notice of dishonor to return if for-
warded by the payor bank on the day of its receipt of the item.
(4) It is the common practice of all drawee banks to dispatch
notice of dishonor for non-payment prior to midnight of its next
business day,2 2 and in the absence of such notice prior parties will
assume that the check has been paid.
19 Feezer, Acceptance of Bills of Exchange by Conduct, 12 Minn. L. Rev.
129 (1927).
20 The considerations seem to be the same when instruments are pre-
sented for acceptance or for paymnet. The other sections of the
N.I.L. provide that upon presentment immediate action must be taken,
the drawee has twenty-four hours in which to accept, §§ 136, 137,
and his failure to do so may be treated by the holder as dishonor,
or the drawer and indorsers are relieved, § 150; notice of protest
and dishonor must be given within one business day, §§ 155, 103,
and 104.
21 Moulton v. Mattison, 79 N.Y. 627 (1880); Short v. Blount, 99 N.C.
49, 5 S.E. 190 (1888); First Nat. Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460,
51 Am. Rep. 529 (1884). For acts that would constitute conversion
of the bill, see Westberg v. Chicago Lbr. Co. 117 Wis. 589, 94 N.W.
572 (1903); Hibbard v. Parciak, 94 Conn. 562, 109 Atl. 725 (1920).
22 Supra note 13.
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The most interesting aspect of the instant case is that the result
on its particular facts seems to be correct under either of the above
positions, but on a point not considered by the court. The delay
in return of the check by the defendant bank was caused by the
federal bank examiners assuming control of all the records of the
bank. It would appear that had the court adopted the dictates of
commercial custom and accepted either of the above positions,2 3
the defendant bank would still be absolved from liability under
section 62-1,11324 (section 113, N.I.L.) 25 which excuses notice of
dishonor when caused by circumstances beyond one's control.
In conclusion it is submitted that the court reached the correct
result only to further confuse the incomplete statutory pattern
applicable to checks presented for payment. The expansion of
section 137 of the N.I.L. to encompass presentment of checks for
payment through the mail reaches a workable result under exist-
ing commercial custom, and in turn insures uniformity in all cases.
Notwithstanding the court's contrary dictum, it would seem that
section 62-308 establishes an additional effective standard of con-
duct for drawee banks in ordinary mail collection cases and should
determine "when" delay will constitute liability even though sec-
tion 137 is confined to presentment for acceptance.
Robert L. Walker '60
23 In Rock Finance Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 339 Ill. App. 319, 89 N.E.2d
828 (1950), construing the phrase "business day" under Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 98, § 207a (1954), (similar to § 62-308 above), see the court's dictum
to the effect that a drawee bank who failed to return a check prior
to midnight of the next business day would be an implied acceptance
and a basis for liability.
24 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 62-1,113 (Reissue 1958).
25 BILL OF EXCHANGE ACT § 50(1) uses "party giving notice"
instead of "holder."
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